Heidegger and technology

 

In March of last year, newspaper readers in the UK were met with headlines along the lines of 'Primary pupils to learn Twitter instead of history' and 'Exit Winston Churchill, enter Twitter'. These articles were written in response to the publication of Sir Jim Rose's proposals for a new primary curriculum, which have since been overturned by the new coalition Government. Predictably enough, conservative papers such as the Daily Mail and Daily Telegraph were deeply disapproving towards such ideas. Now, let us put aside for the moment the question of whether these articles have distorted Rose's report. Let us also put to one side the absurdity exhibited in the idea of teaching the next generation of pupils about a strain of technology over which they will no doubt have a level of mastery over and above that of many of their teachers!

Let us instead cut to the chase. These newspaper headlines help us to focus our attention on a very important matter, that of the relationship between education and technology. Let us note that 'technological understanding' is one of the six 'core areas' identified in Rose's review. We see technology pervading every subject area, not least in geography where Geographical Information Systems (GIS) are playing an ever more central part. Is this, on the whole, a desirable circumstance? Is it anything new? Has education ever in fact been detached from technology? Or has a technological understanding of being always permeated education? In coming blog posts I will be considering these questions through Heidegger's critique of technology. First though, I need to take a closer look at what Heidegger actually had to say about technology, again with the help of Michael Zimmerman.

This is made all the more difficult because Heidegger's attitude to technology changed significantly during the course of his life. But we can say that, in general, he saw the modern technological era as but the latest and most degraded phase in humankind's forgetting of being, an era in which entities are viewed as mere resources to be exploited in the name of human power and security. To understand this, we need to get our head around what Heidegger understood by 'being', and in particular by 'Dasein'. For Heidegger, being is not an entity, but rather the event of the 'presencing' or 'unconcealment' of an entity. Dasein names the very distinct kind of being pertaining to humans. Only Dasein exists in the world in such a way that its own being and the being of others is an issue for itself.

Heidegger put special emphasis on the role of Dasein in enabling the being of entities to come to presence and manifest itself, by providing the 'clearing' in which entities can show up as entities. In case this all sounds a little too anthropocentric however, Zimmerman reminds us that Dasein did not own or produce this clearing, but rather is appropriated as this clearing. Dasein is in this fashion summoned by being and finds itself always already thrown into the world of entities and the ontological play of concealing and unconcealing. Authentic Dasein denotes a kind of embodied being-in-the-world whose essence is 'care', where 'to care' refers not only to ontic intervention but principally to the simple 'letting be' of entities; of not submitting them all the time to the calculating reason of human subjectivity. Authentic Dasein can be seen in this way as the 'shepherd of being'.

According to Heidegger, the degeneration of our understanding of being began in ancient Greek thought. Though Plato was to an extent still alert to the 'presencing' aspect of being, it was nevertheless he who first interpreted being as constant presence or eidos, the eternally unchanging form, thereby founding Western metaphysics. At a later date, Christianity would further embed this understanding of being as permanent presence, now produced by and grounded in a creator God. With the coming of Descartes and the age of reason, humanity would finally arrogate this creation and grounding to itself, "by asserting that for something 'to be' means for it to be representable as a clear and distinct idea of the human subject." In this critical phase entities, or 'things in themselves', were once and for all swallowed up by the human subject who was now the source of all knowledge and value.

This deteriorating historical, metaphysical understanding of being is what ultimately paved the way for the modern, technological, nihilistic era. The technological understanding of being is first and foremost a metaphysical one; hence Heidegger's famous claim that "the essence of technology is nothing technological". In the modern age, entities are 'challenged forth' to be interchangeable raw material to service human needs. Nature is thereby "deprived of any status apart from that of an object for scientific analysis or raw material for modern technology." This highly calculating and rationalistic era may not mark the end of history however; Heidegger appeared to believe that a post-metaphysical era of being was imminent. This would not be a straightforward return to an archaic way of life, but rather a new receptiveness to being as is exemplified in the work of art.

There is much that could be expanded upon in this short account, but this is far as I am going to delve into Heidegger's philosophy of technology at the current time. Needless to say, Heidegger's perspective on technology was, and still is, seen as rather idiosyncratic and has been subjected to much criticism over the years. However, though Heidegger's precise delineation of the 'history of being' might be disputable there is certainly something in his overall analysis that chimes with my own thinking. In the coming months and years I look forward to contemplating carefully the relationship between education and the objectifying, technological understanding of being that may still even now constitute our fundamental way of being-in-the-world. Does technology necessarily restrict the authentic disclosure of being, or can technology actually aid in renewing and revitalising our connection with being, or with nature? Can education, properly thought, bring us 'back to being' and facilitate a less domineering, more respectful attitude towards nature that would meet the aims of environmentalists whilst remaining progressive and optimistic about the capacities and future of humankind?

Zimmerman's 2002 essay 'Heidegger's Phenomenology and Contemporary Environmentalism' makes for excellent further reading and can be found at his departmental web page.

Photo is by Flickr user mandyxclear and is made available under a Creative Commons license

On reconciling progressivism and environmentalism

In my last post I remarked on the similarities to be found in Kathryn Ecclestone and Dennis Hayes' controversial thesis that a therapeutic ethos is becoming prevalent in our culture with the arguments made by humanist critics such as Luc Ferry against the theory of deep ecology. In the former we are told that there is in our culture an increasing and dangerous preoccupation with our emotional and irrational self and in the latter we see the emergence of a theory that seemingly wants to expel humanity from its position of superiority and views us instead as being of only equal importance to any other part of nature. It is arguable that both trends point in the same ultimate direction: towards a diminished notion of the human being that views it as fragile and vulnerable with little of the capacity for rational thought and willed, autonomous action so beloved of all those of a progressive stripe. Since writing that post I have been reading an essay by Michael Zimmerman (2003), who surveys some attempts that have been made to philosophically reconcile progressivism and environmentalism.

Many thinkers are in agreement that the emergence of European modernity saw a definite break from previous understandings of our relationship to nature, largely due to advances in natural science which have enabled us to predict, control and exploit the natural world. Meanwhile, in modern times 'man' developed "a new mode of subjectivity, egoic rationality, and a related ideology, anthropocentric humanism, which portray man as the source of value, the standard for truth, and the master of nature." (Zimmerman, 2003: 4) For many radical environmentalists, it would seem that only a turn towards a post-anthropocentric horizon could remedy the environmental and societal ills that have been caused by such an egotistical attitude, as it is simply not possible to fix the ecological mess with the same rationalistic, calculating tools that instigated it. From the perspective of radical ecologists, humankind is often portrayed as but one strand in a 'cosmic web' and only an attitude of compassion, empathy and submission to the greater whole will enable humans to get over the current ecological impasse.

The progressive response to such ideas is one of alarm and consternation at the apparently regressive tendencies that they display. As Zimmerman notes, in "demanding that humans conform to an allegedly more 'natural' way of doing things, and proclaiming the need for a mystical reunion with nature, radical environmentalists ostensibly promote an anti-humanism that... is inconsistent with progressive views of history." (Ibid: 5-6) These anti-humanistic views are seen to be all too compatible with reactionary politics, and we may indeed see in some of them (as Luc Ferry certainly does) the disquieting trace of the kind of ecofacism that drove anti-modern Nazi rhetoric. It is of interest here to examine the thought of Martin Heidegger, as Zimmerman does. Heidegger is a philosopher I have a considerable interest in, but his contribution to Western thought is often overshadowed by his engagement with National Socialism and his now well-proven early allegiance to it. Nevertheless, it is perhaps this dangerous tension in Heidegger’s thought that makes his work so fascinating and so crucial to engage with.

Heidegger saw the current phase of technological modernity as but the latest expression of humanity's degenerating relationship to the being of entities. According to his 'history of being', the domineering, exploitative relationship to Nature that typified his age could not be explained in purely social or economic terms but only with reference to metaphysics. In pre-Socratic times, humans existed in an authentic 'ontological openness' that allowed the being of entities (or Being) to reveal itself or 'shine forth'. However, with the coming of Socrates, Plato and their followers, humanity began its quest to find an underlying ground or foundation for reality. This search intensified and culminated in the philosophy of Descartes and others who saw humans as possessing a self-grounding rationality and free will that made them quite separate from nature (that infamous mind/body split). This changing conception of humanity and of Being paved the way for the typically calculating modern relationship to entities in which they are viewed as a 'standing reserve' to be 'challenged forth' and ordered. This is the essence of modern technology which Heidegger termed Gestell, usually translated in English as 'enframing'.

The modern way of revealing entities is thus essentially an objectifying one: "technological modernity is simply the working out of the claim that for something to be it must be the object for the autonomous, self-grounding human subject." (Ibid: 18) If we accept this as an accurate portrayal of modernity, then we can reasonably ask: where next? We have already seen some of the criticisms levelled at radical ecologists and others who would have make us return to a more primitive, 'authentic' way of dwelling upon the Earth. Zimmerman turns to the thought of Ken Wilber, who has developed an integral approach that tries in many ways to accomplish a reconciliation of environmentalism and progressivism. I haven't read any of Wilber's work myself, though now I have read this essay I expect I shall do. It would seem that Wilber perceives a future course for postmodern humanity in which body and nature 'below' and divine 'above' are reintegrated into a new evolutionary consciousness. In such reintegration, "the individual selfhood of rational-egoic subjectivity is both included and transcended in a more comprehensive form of awareness that is open both to nature and divine."(Ibid: 31)

For Wilber, progressives and environmentalists alike share a 'flat' ontology, largely influenced by natural science, in which the material and the physical alone comprise reality. According to Wilber, however, reality is not at all like this. The physical is but one plane in a many levelled reality, and the biosphere is contained within the 'noosphere'. In this vision, self-reflective consciousness constitutes a different level of reality that evolves from and surpasses the physical and organic planes. This seems akin to many Eastern philosophies that I have read. Wilber maintains that humans must develop this postmodern awareness, which is certainly not a regression, but which rather "transcends customary boundaries" such as the physical, organic, mental and artificial. Interestingly, as Zimmerman clarifies, "a prerequisite for the rise of this more integrative awareness is that the majority of people need to develop modern consciousness and institutions, although such development must avoid critical damage to the biosphere. Hence, the need for environmentalists and progressives to cooperate in reminding each other of what the other finds so important." (Ibid: 40, my emphasis)

So, in order for humanity to advance to the next level of consciousness, it would appear that the contemporary modern era of rational-egoic selfhood is, if you like, a necessary evil. It is a troubling but obligatory stage in our evolution. What’s more, despite its disdain by many primitivists, technology itself might be a crucial element in this evolution. The key may be in finding ways to use technology in ways that enhance rather than constrain human awareness. As Zimmerman writes, “there is no inherent reason that such technological innovations will impede rather than develop freedom, or that they will undermine rather than contribute to the higher, more integrated forms of consciousness.” (Ibid: 37-38).

With this blog posting I realise that I have somewhat strayed away from my usual field of geography education. I am treading in relatively unknown land. This is purposeful. Sometimes it befits us to look far beyond our immediate discipline, our intellectual comfort zone, in the hope that we may bring something back. Indeed, I hope in future posts to think through what the ideas explored here might mean for education and geography education in particular.

You can access Michael Zimmerman's 2003 essay online from his departmental web page.

You can also view Ken Wilber's remarkable looking website.

Photo is by Flickr user UIC Digital Collections and is made available under a Creative Commons license

Truly human?

In my last post I explained how Ecclestone and Hayes (2009) see the rise of therapeutic education and its focus on 'personal relevance' and 'soft skills' to be a grave threat to established liberal notions of education. Indeed, they deem it to be profoundly 'anti-educational'. Such techniques, they claim, turn young people's worlds inwards and instead of broadening their horizons cause them to see themselves as fragile, vulnerable and 'diminished' selves. Ecclestone and Hayes make it clear that they do not see this as a predicament facing education alone, as the idea of the diminished self has now come to permeate our entire culture and they attempt to chart why and how this has come to be the case. The withdrawal from subject based teaching to what they dismiss as 'faddish innovations' such as 'learning to learn' reflects an anti-intellectual climate in which confidence in the potential of human beings has tumbled. This view they make startlingly clear in perhaps one of the most controversial sentences in their book. Regarding the decline of the ideal of liberal education they state:

"Part of the reason for its loss is that many educationalists and teachers see children as incapable of education because they are no longer seen as truly human: there is no point offering an education you do not believe in to children you believe cannot benefit from it." (Ecclestone and Hayes, 2009: 143)

So as well as being anti-educational, it would seem that modern trends in education are also anti-human and reflect the misanthropic sentiment that humans are no longer masters of their destinies. Ecclestone and Hayes cite Bookchin (1995) as identifying this problem over a decade ago, in his contention that human society was suffering from a 'failure of nerves', a waning belief in our 'uniquely human attributes' and a general decay in our self-confidence as a species. The decline of traditional subjects in schools mirrors this large scale trend. The outcome of all this, for these authors, is a disastrous paradox: despite the rhetoric of empowerment and increasing happiness, the incursion of therapeutic education results in a population that is unconfident and unsure of itself and which turns to the state in order to receive instruction on what to value and how to behave. They claim that this is why the New Labour government has been so eager to adopt these ideas into its educational policy. All in all, the current drive towards happiness and well-being looks to be authoritarianism by another name.

Now, surely most if not all educationalists can agree that education should enable those educated to become confident and happy individuals, even if this is not the foremost aim they have in mind. If Ecclestone and Hayes are right then there would seem to be a strong argument here against the variety of techniques they group together as 'therapeutic education'. But despite adding a whole section of their book subtitled 'a response to our critics' I still remain unconvinced in a number of areas. For a start, throughout the book the evidence for the case remains at a very anecdotal level, usually consisting of short interviews with friends and colleagues and their children! In addition, there seems to be something very arbitrary about what they choose to bundle together under the 'therapeutic' label. Of course, any teaching practice whose sole focus is on instilling proper attitudes, values and behaviour into children is really rather undesirable, as is any practice that instills a feeling of vulnerability and weakness. But do all of the diverse pedagogical methods that these authors put under this banner really have this insidious effect? With such anecdotal evidence I really find myself with no way of knowing.

Their arguments remind me of these put forward by the philosopher and one time French Minister of Education Luc Ferry in his book The New Ecological Order (1995) which I read whilst researching my MA dissertation. In this book, Ferry mounts a case against deep ecology, which he considers to be threatening human culture and self-confidence in the same way as Ecclestone and Hayes think the therapeutic ethos is. According to Ferry, the entire world of reason and the mind is endangered by the emergence of radical ecology. This dangerous theory papers over all that is truly special in human culture and jeopardizes our democratic societies and institutions. For Ferry, deep ecology is fundamentally undemocratic and as a fundamentalism it has arisen to fill the void left by the demise of other ideologies. It represents a new ideological order that, left unchallenged, would seize the hearts of those battle hardy militants who have been 'left in a state of shock' by the 'death of communism and leftism'. This is somewhat similar to a point made by Ecclestone and Hayes to the effect that therapeutic culture has replaced the gap left by the passing of collective forms of working class organisation and the consequent 'absence of politics'.

In both these cases, the opposition depicted seems to be one of human reason and autonomy against looming and sinister forces that would undermine that hard won reason and autonomy. These forces might take the form of peculiar ideas about humans as mere parts of a living, interdependent system called the Earth or they may be more general doubts about our ability to reason, tackle difficult areas of knowledge and to cope with our emotions. These are big claims and all I am doing at the moment is setting out the scene. These are issues that I will be confronting again and again in my work, and I feel sure that some reconciliation can and must be made. Ecclestone and Hayes state with conviction that 'the majority of young people are not damaged'. On the contrary, based upon my own (anecdotal!) school experiences and from conversations with my partner who takes yoga into schools, I see that there are a lot of young people out there needing some healing. I am also unafraid to acknowledge that the Earth itself is desperately in need of healing.

The big question is, what kind of humanity do we aspire too? As the Ecclestone and Hayes are at pains to point out, we are not going to get very far if our human capacity for self-belief and self-will are reduced to such a level that we come to consider ourselves as inherently flawed beings, who can't even lift a finger without harming the Earth. In order to stand a chance of changing the world, we first need the requisite confidence to do so. We also need the requisite knowledge, and for me that's exactly where geography education comes in...

References

Bookchin, M. (1995) Re-Enchanting Humanity. A Defense of the Human Spirit Against Anti-Humanism, Misanthropy, Mysticism and Primitivism. New York: Cassell.

Ecclestone, K. and Hayes, D. (2009) The Dangerous Rise of Therapeutic Education. London: Routledge.

Ferry, L. (1995) The New Ecological Order. Volk, C. (Trans.) Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.

Photo is by Flickr user Cold Press Publishing and is made available under a Creative Commons license